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Nova Species 
Cornelius van der Merwe 
I.  Introduction 
In modern law it is generally accepted that one of the require-
ments for acquisition of ownership by specification (specificatio) is 
that a new species (nova species) must be created.  I would like to 
start my examination of what is meant by a nova species by pre-
senting an abbreviated version of the facts and decision in the 
most recent case in Scotland on the issue, Kinloch Damph Ltd. v. 
Nordvik Salmon Farms Ltd.1 
  Pursuers sold one and a quarter million smolt (young salmon 
in embryonic state) to the defenders on credit with reservation of 
ownership.  The defenders placed the smolt in seawater in cages 
and fed and husbanded them, with the result that they developed 
from smolts into salmon thirty times their original size.  When the 
defenders went into receivership, the outstanding balance of the 
price was still over £700,000.  The pursuers preferred to rely on 
their proprietary claim by virtue of their reservation of owner-
ship, which was worth more than the undisputed monetary 
claim.2 
  The defenders argued inter alia that by virtue of their efforts 
and material in the form of husbandry and feed, the smolts had 
ceased to exist as such and that a nova species, the mature 
salmon, irreducible to their constituent parts, had come into exis-
tence.  Although they accepted the expert opinion that smolt and 
salmon are of the same biological species, salmo salar,3 they ar-
gued that the physiological changes which smolts undergo in 
becoming mature salmon (namely, changes affecting the gill and 
kidney which allow the fish to adapt to changing salinity condi-
tions) were sufficient to support the conclusion that an adult 
salmon is a nova species in the legal sense.  In support they cited 
Bell's Principles to the effect that, if the separate existence of the 
                                         
1  1999 Outer House Cases LEXIS (June 30, 1999). 
2  Id. at paras. 1–2. 
3 On  salmo salar see J. W. Jones, The Salmon (London, 1959), 153–
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materials of which a new product is made is destroyed, the prop-
erty is with the workman.4 
  The pursuers denied that a nova species had been created and 
insisted that the original goods were still in existence.  The fish 
they sold had grown to maturity, but they were still the same 
entities and of the same species salmo salar.  The fish were older, 
more mature, larger, and more valuable, but they were still the 
same creatures.  There was no destruction of the original materi-
als, no process of manufacture or creation, but rather the growth 
of a living creature.  The growth and physiological change that 
the smolts had undergone in developing into salmon was a natu-
ral process, which they could have undergone in the wild without 
human intervention.  They found it instructive that the Roman 
and institutional writers did not formulate a test for applying 
specification but rather used illustrations, and in doing so did not 
refer to the growth of living creatures, although animals were 
important in their everyday life.  Therefore they urged the court 
not to extend the doctrine to animate creatures.  They also re-
ferred to the fact that the emphasis placed on increase in value 
and market considerations by Lord Mayfield in Armour v. 
Thyssen Edelstahlwerke A.G.5 did not find favor on appeal to the 
Inner House of the Court of Session.6 
  Lord Macfadyen rejected the idea that a nova species had 
been created on which the doctrine of specification could operate.  
The main dispute was whether the doctrine of specification could 
be applied to the natural growth (albeit aided by human nour-
ishment and husbandry) of a living creature.  He conceded that 
there is a sense in which the smolts could be said no longer to 
exist and that the process of their development into mature sal-
mon was irreversible.  However, he concluded that the proper 
scope of the doctrine was in relation to inanimate objects or sub-
stances created by human effort, out of materials which are used 
up and cease to exist in the process of creation.  No authority, he 
said, deals with the growth of living creatures, and the writings 
                                         
4  Kinloch Damph, paras. 21–25, 36, 38–40.  G. J. Bell, Principles of 
the Law of Scotland, 10th ed. (Edinburgh, 1899), 504 (§ 1298(1)): "The 
rules are: —  That if the materials, as a separate existence, be destroyed 
in bona fide, the property is with the workman; . . . .  That if still capable 
of restoration to their original shape, the property is held to be with the 
owner of the materials . . . ." 
5  1986 S.L.T. 452, 458H (Outer House). 
6  Kinloch Damph, paras. 43–44.  See Armour v. Thyssen Edelstahl-
werke A.G., 1989 S.L.T. 182, 188K, 190J (Inner House, Second Division), 
rev'd on other grounds, 1990 S.L.T. 891, 1991 S.C.L.R. 139 (House of 
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contain no references to specification of growing animals.  In light 
of the greater importance of animals in daily life in former times, 
the absence of such references was a strong indication that the 
doctrine had no such application.  He therefore concluded that a 
fish farmer who feeds and husbands large numbers of salmo salar 
while they develop from smolts into salmon does not create a new 
thing separate and distinct from smolt, i.e., does not create a nova 
species, ownership of which vests in the caretaker.  As objects of 
ownership, the mature salmon in the defenders' cage are the same 
as the smolts which the pursuers supplied.7 
II.  Roman Law 
In order to assess whether the judge was correct in deciding that 
no nova species had come into existence, one has to go back to the 
roots of the legal concept of specification, the concept that a per-
son who makes a species from material belonging to another 
becomes the owner of the final product.8 Although the concept is 
derived from Roman law, the label specificatio is a neologism 
coined by medieval writers from the phrase speciem facere: to 
produce a species.9  Another interesting fact is that the phrase 
nova species is encountered only once in the Roman texts.10  For 
the rest, the terms aliquam species,11 suam speciem pristinam non 
continet,12 species mutata,13 and aliud sit materia, aliud navis14 
are used.  One can further assume that all the Roman jurists 
agreed on the factual circumstances that distinguished speciem 
facere from the accession of an accessory to a principal thing (e.g., 
adiunctio) and the mere mixing of solids and the fusion of fluids.  
The Sabinians and Proculians only disagreed on whether the 
owner of the materials or the maker of the species became the 
owner of the final product.  The Sabinians decided that matter 
                                         
7  Kinloch Damph, para. 47. 
8  For modern literature on specification, see B. C. Stoop, "Non Solet 
Locatio Dominium Mutare: Some Remarks on Specificatio in Classical 
Roman Law," 66 T. v. R. 3 (1998); G. Dolezalek, "Plädoyer für Ein-
schränkung des § 950 BGB (Verarbeitung)," 195 Archiv für die civilistische 
Praxis 392, 394–96 (1995); D. J. Osler, "Specificatio in Scots Law," in R. 
Evans-Jones (ed.), The Civil Law Tradition in Scotland, (Edinburgh, 
1995), 100–27. 
9  See Osler (note 8), 100; T. Mayer-Maly, "Spezifikation: Leitfälle, 
Begriffsbildung, Rechtsinstitut," 73 ZSS (rom. Abt.) 120, 128 (1956). 
10  D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.) in fine. 
11  D.41.1.12.1 (Callistratus 2 inst.).  
12  D.6.1.5.1 (Ulpian 16 ed.). 
13  D.41.1.24 (Paul 14 Sab.). 
14  D.13.7.18.3 (Paul 29 ed.).  2004  Nova Species  99 
 
 
always trumped form and allowed the owner of the materials to 
raise an action for production in order to eventually institute the 
rei vindicatio for the final product.15  By contrast the Proculians 
favored form and allocated ownership of the final product to the 
maker.  Therefore all the examples, whether used by the Sabini-
ans or the Proculians, could be used as the basis for deciding the 
content and scope of the requirement of nova species. 
  Roman processes which gave rise to the application of the 
rules of specification are confined to five industrial processes:16 
first,  agricultural processes, like producing must or wine from 
grapes,17 mead by mixing honey and wine,18 olive oil from olives,19 
and corn by threshing ears of corn;20 second, smithying processes, 
as where masses of raw gold, silver, steel, or other metals are 
shaped into vases, drinking vessels, goblets, plates, dishes, or 
statues, and vice versa;21 third, tailoring, as where garments and 
other kinds of bodily covering are made from wool;22 fourth, 
carpentry, as where ships or items of furniture such as benches 
and cupboards are made from cypresses,23 and fifth, apothecary 
processes, like the production of ointments, eye-salves,24 and per-
fumes.  One can assume that the products of all these processes 
would constitute a nova species or at least aliqua species for the 
rules of specification to apply.  None of these processes deal with 
                                         
15  D.10.4.12.3 (Paul 26 ed.). 
16  See generally Mayer-Maly (note 9), 154. 
17  D.10.4.12.3 (Paul 26 ed.): si quis ex uvis meis mustum fecerit. 
18  D.6.1.5.1 (Ulpian 16 ed.): si ex melle meo, vino tuo factum sit mul-
sum. 
19  D.10.4.12.3 (Paul 26 ed.): vel ex olivis oleum. 
20  D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.): vel ex uvis aut olivis aut spicis 
tuis vinum vel oleum vel frumentum. 
21  D.10.4.9.3 (Ulpian 24 ed.):  veluti si ex scypho massa facta sit; 
D.30.44.2 (Ulpian 22 Sab.): si pocula quis legavit et massa facta est vel 
contra;  D.h.t.44.3:  si lancem legavit et massam fecit, mox poculum; 
D.32.49.5 (Ulpian 22 Sab.): aurum . . . legatum sit et postea sit conflatum; 
D.32.88.3 (Paul 5 leg. Iul. Pap.): massa autem legata scyphi ex ea facti; 
D.41.1.12.1 (Callistratus 2 inst.): si aere meo et argento tuo conflato aliqua 
species facta sit; D.41.1.24 (Paul 14 Sab.): veluti si meo aere statuam aut 
argento scyphum fecisses. 
22  D.30.44.2 (Ulpian 22 Sab.): item si lana legetur et vestimentum ex 
ea fiat; D.32.88 pr. (Paul 5 leg. Iul. Pap.): lana legata vestem, quae ex ea 
facta sit; D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.): vel ex lana tua vestimentum. 
23  D.13.7.18.3 (Paul 29 ed.): navem ex ea materia factum; D.32.88.1 
(Paul 5 leg. Iul. Pap.): et materia legata navis armariumve ex ea factum; 
D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.): vel ex tabulis tuis navem aut armarium 
aut subsellia fecero. 
24  See A. Vinnius, Institutionum Imperialium Commentarius, 2nd 
ed. (Amsterdam, 1655), at Institutes 2.1.25, § 2, on the meaning of em-
plastrum and collyrium. 100  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
living creatures or rely primarily on natural growth rather than 
human endeavor to effect a significant change in the substance of 
the materials used. 
 For  a  nova species to be created, the former substance must 
be significantly changed.  In order to quantify the extent of 
change required for a nova species to emerge, I examined the 
verbs used to indicate such change.  In most examples the neutral 
verb facere and its derivations are used, as in fecerit vestimenta25 
and factum sit mulsum.26  In a few instances the stronger verbs 
transferre and transfigurare are used, as in aliud corpus sit trans-
lata27 and ornamentum dissolutum aut transfiguratum.28  In the 
texts dealing with the legacy of a usufruct, it is implied that a 
nova species would have been created if the final product had a 
new name.29 
  The decisions of the individual jurists have of course been 
influenced by the philosophical theories of their times.30  We are 
told that the Sabinians were influenced by the idea of the Stoics 
that matter is the essence of an object, and that therefore the 
Sabinians awarded the final product to the owner of the materi-
                                         
25  D.10.4.12.3 (Paul 26 ed.). 
26  D.6.1.5.1 (Ulpian 16 ed.).  Other instances of facere:  D.7.4.10.5 
(Ulpian 17 Sab.);  D.13.7.18.3 (Paul 29 ed.);  D.30.44.2 (Ulpian 22 Sab.); 
D.32.88 pr.–3 (Paul 5 leg. Iul. Pap.); D.41.1.24 (Paul 14 Sab.).  This verb is 
fairly neutral and does not really give an indication of the extent of change 
required to make the final product a new thing. 
27  D.10.4.9.3 (Ulpian 24 ed.): in aliud corpus res sit translata veluti si 
ex scypho massa facta sit: . . . nam mutata forma prope interemit sub-
stantiam rei. 
28  D.7.4.10.6 (Ulpian 17 Sab.):  proinde et ornamentum dissolutum 
aut transfiguratum extinguit usum fructum.  See also D.h.t.10.7: si autem 
[navis] dissoluta sit, licet isdem tabulis nulla praeterea adiecta restaurata 
sit, usum fructum extinctum; D.32.49.5 (Ulpian 22 Sab.): aurum . . . sit . . . 
conflatum, materia tamen maneat; D.41.1.12.1 (Callistratus 2 inst.): si aere 
meo et argento tuo conflato aliqua species facta sit;  D.41.1.24 (Paul 14 
Sab.): si materia manente species dumtaxat forte mutata sit. 
29  The view that there is a new species whenever there is a change of 
name may well have been derived from the texts on legacies dealing with 
objects left in a legacy, objects which have in the meantime changed their 
form.  Thus if a mass of metal is left as a usufruct and utensils (vessels or 
dishes) are made, the usufruct expires.  D.7.4.10.5 (Ulpian 17 Sab.):  si 
massae usus fructus legetur et ex ea vasa sint facta vel contra, Cassius 
apud Urseium scribit interire usum fructum: quam sententiam puto veram.  
D.h.t.10.7: ship dismantled and rebuilt.  See also D. G. van der Keessel, 
Dictata ad Justiniani Institutionum, ed. B. Beinart, et al. (Amsterdam, 
1965) (citing D.41.1.26 pr., Paul 14 Sab.), 1:162: Vinum autem quod inde 
feci est nova species, quae antea non exstitit, et novum nomen habet.  
30  See H. G. Henckert, Saakvorming as Wyse van Eiendomsverkry-
ging, thesis submitted for the degree of Master of Laws at the University 
of Stellenbosch (November, 1988), 15–17; Dolezalek (note 8), 394–405. 2004  Nova Species  101 
 
 
als: quia sine material nulla species effici possit.31  By contrast, 
the Proculians, influenced by Aristotle and the Peripatetics, who 
taught that form is more important than matter, awarded the 
final product to the maker or creator of the form: quia quod fac-
tum est, antea nullius fuerat.32   Philosophy also definitely influ-
enced the other requirement for specification, namely, that the 
final product must not be reducible to its original state or condi-
tion.  Thus, although a new form, identity, or species was created, 
some products were in essence reversible, like metals that could 
be melted down, and perhaps also a ship or garment constructed 
of prepared planks or cloth were considered reducible to whatever 
condition they were in before. 
  The extent to which the original materials or thing must be 
changed to become a new thing was also influenced by the Procu-
lian rationale for awarding the final product to the maker, a ra-
tionale that eventually became the predominant view and was 
also accepted and restricted by Justinian.  As to the rationale it-
self, three theories have been propounded.33  The first is the 
occupation theory, according to which the old object perished once 
it had been changed into another species.  The new product is 
thus a res nullius susceptible of being acquired in ownership by 
occupation.  One difficulty with this theory is that the maker 
never consciously takes possession with the intention of becoming 
owner, and that in long fabricating processes the maker may not 
be the first on the scene to occupy the final product.  The other 
difficulty is that the texts speak only of virtual or quasi destruc-
tion and not total destruction of the substance: nam mutata forma 
prope interemit substantiam rei.34  The other theory is that the 
maker acquires the final product by some form of accession, with 
the new form being the principal thing to which the original ma-
terial accedes.  Since the workmanship consisting of the toil, 
labor, and skill employed by the creator of the new thing plays an 
important role in this theory, it has in later times been dubbed 
the "workmanship" or "labor" theory and ultimately as the "re-
ward" theory, with the workman being rewarded with ownership 
of the final product for the time and skill put into creating the 
                                         
31  D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.). 
32  Id. 
33  See generally H. Coing, Europäische Privatrecht (Munich, 1985), 
vol. 1, § 55, II, 2; Dolezalek (note 8), 405–10; Henckert (note 30), 10–15. 
34  D.10.4.9.3 (Ulpian 24 ed.):  veluti si ex scypho massa facta sit: 
quamquam enim massam exhibeat, ad exhibendum tenebitur, nam mutata 
forma prope interemit substantiam rei. 102  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
final product.35  The main criticism of this theory is that there is 
no general principle in Roman law that a person who has ex-
pended time and labor on the property of someone else is awarded 
with the ownership of the thing.  Thus the dying of wool,36 the 
refining of metal, and the repair or improvement of another's 
property were not considered specification since no new species 
had been formed.  This is supported by those jurists who held the 
opinion that, despite the toil and labor involved in the threshing 
of ears of corn, the corn that is produced is not a new species but 
only the revelation of a pre-existing species.37  The most convinc-
ing theory remains that of Wieacker,38 who suggested that the 
rules of specification were, in the final analysis, developed to give 
recognition to the practical difficulty of claiming an object which 
has changed so much in form that it is no longer traceable by 
means of a rei vindicatio.  The main reason why the Proculians 
awarded the final product to the maker was therefore the practi-
cal difficulty of the owner in identifying his or her materials, 
absent the English doctrine of tracing.  According to Wieacker's 
theory, the old thing need not have perished but only changed to 
such an extent that it was no longer identifiable for the purposes 
of rei vindicatio. 
III.  Roman-Dutch Law 
Unlike the Roman texts, the Roman-Dutch authorities contain 
express references to the requirement of a nova species in their 
definitions of specification.  Thus Grotius in his Inleidinge states 
that a person who in good faith gives a new ghedaente (namely, a 
new form, figure, shape, or appearance) to the matter (stoffe) of 
another's ownership acquires ownership thereof.39  Huber speaks 
                                         
35 The strongest support for this theory is found in D.7.4.10.7 
(Ulpian 17 Sab.), where a person who had dismantled a ship and then 
rebuilt it was rewarded with the ownership of the ship by virtue of the 
doctrine of specification.  See also D.50.16.13.1 (Ulpian 7 ed.): Res "abesse" 
videntur (ut Sabinus ait et Pedius probat) etiam hae, quarum corpus 
manet, forma mutata est: et ideo si corruptae redditae sint vel trans-
figuratae, videri abesse, quoniam plerumque plus est in manus pretio, 
quam in re. 
36  D.41.1.26.2 (Paul 14 Sab.). 
37  D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.). 
38  F. Wieacker, "Spezifikation: Schulprobleme und Sachprobleme," in 
W. Kunkel and H. J. Wolff (edd.), Festschrift für Ernst Rabel (Tübingen, 
1954), 2:263–92. 
39 H. de Groot [Grotius], Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-
Geleerdheid [Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence], ed. F. Dovring, et al. 
(Leiden, 1952), at 2.8.2.  See also W. Schorer, Aantekeningen over de In-
leidinge tot de Hollandsche Rechts-Geleerdheid van Hugo de Groot [Notes 2004  Nova Species  103 
 
 
about a nieuw-maeksel or new-made article;40 Vinnius uses the 
phrase speciei novae ex aliena materia formatio;41 Johannes Voet, 
the phrase novae speciei confectio;42 and van Leeuwen, qua quis ex 
aliena materia novam speciem confert.43  Some use stronger verbs 
than facere, indicating a manufacturing process: Vinnius (trans-
formare and formare),44 and Voet (conferre).45 
  Most Roman-Dutch writers repeat some or all of the Roman 
examples of novae species.46  The most extensive list is found in 
van Leeuwen's Censura Forensis, where he quotes the examples 
of wine, olive oil, or corn being produced from another's grapes, 
olives, or ears of corn, mead from another's wine and honey, 
ointment or perfume from another's medicinal products (medica-
menta), clothing from another's wool, and ships, cupboards, or 
benches from another's wood (tabulae).47  This is supplemented by 
                                         
on the Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius], 2nd ed. 
(Middelburg, 1797), 150–52 (at Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.2) (an English 
translation of Schorer is appended in A. F. S. Maasdorp (tr.), The Intro-
duction to Dutch Jurisprudence of Hugo Grotius, 3rd ed. (Capetown, 
1903)); W. de Vos and G. G. Visagie (edd.), Scheltinga se "Dictata" oor 
Hugo de Groot se "Inleiding tot de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid" [Schel-
tinga's "Dictata" on Hugo Grotius' Introduction to Dutch Jurisprudence] 
(Johannesburg, 1986), 130–31 (at Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.2); van der 
Keessel (note 29), 161 (qui ex aliena materia rudi novam facit speciem) 
(citing J. F. Böckelmann, Compendium Institutionem Justiniani); D. G. 
van der Keessel, Praelectiones Iuris Hodierni ad Hugonis Grotii Intro-
ductionem ad Iurisprudentiam Hollandicam, ed. P. van Warmelo, et al. 
(Amsterdam, 1961), 2:146 (at Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.2) (quod species nova, 
quae facta est). 
40 U.  Huber,  The Jurisprudence of My Time [Heedensdaegse Rechts-
geleertheyt], tr. P. Gane (Durban, 1939), 1:134 (at 2.7.1, 2). 
41  Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, introduction. 
42 J.  Voet,  Commentarius ad Pandectas, 4th ed. (The Hague, 1724), 
2:731. 
43 S.  van  Leeuwen,  Censura Forensis, Theoretico-Practica (Leiden, 
1662), 131. 
44  Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, introduction, uses "transfor-
mare": Qui rem alienam in aliam speciem transformavimus.  In § 5 he cites 
D. Connanus as using the verb formare in explaining how the forming of a 
new ship is guided by the shape of its keel. 
45  Voet (note 42), 731 (at D.41.1, § 21): specificatio seu novae speciei 
confectio. 
46  See, e.g., Schorer (note 39), 150–52 (at Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.2); 
van der Keessel (note 29), 161–63; Huber (note 40), 134 (at 2.7.3–5); 
Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25; Voet (note 42), 731–33 (at D.41.1, §§ 
21, 23); S. van Leeuwen, Commentaries on Roman-Dutch Law, ed. C. W. 
Decker (London, 1881), 1:180–81. 
47  Van Leeuwen (note 43), 131: 
ut, si quis ex alienis uvis, olivis, aut spicis, vinum, oleum, aut fru-
mentum fecerit, ex alieno auro, argento, vel aere vas aliquod fecerit, 104  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
the examples of gold and silver cups or statues being fashioned 
from another's raw gold or silver.48  Some new examples are ad-
ded: the brewing of beer from another's malt and corn,49 the mak-
ing of flour from another's corn,50 and the painting of a picture on 
another's canvas.51 
  Vinnius' work on Justinian's Institutes contains examples of 
final products that are not sufficiently new or different to qualify 
as novae species.  The examples are wool being dyed purple, two 
fluids of the same kind being mixed, grapes being dried, olives 
being pickled,52 and also surprisingly cheese or butter made of 
another's milk and an intoxicating drink made of fruit or mixing 
of fruits.53 
  The Roman-Dutch authorities are divided on the question 
whether the threshing of corn from the ears of corn results in the 
creation of a new species.  Although they accept that corn could 
not be reversed to ears of corn, most writers prefer to follow Gaius 
that the threshing of ears of corn does not produce a new species 
but only reveals the species (the corn) that was already there.54  
                                         
vel ex alieno vino et melle mulsum, ex alienis medicamentis emplas-
trum vel collyrium, ex aliena lana vestimentum, vel ex alienis tabulis 
navem, vel armarium vel subsellia fecerit. 
48  See, e.g., Grotius (note 39), at 2.8.3; Schorer (note 39), 151 (at 
Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.2); van der Keessel (note 29), 161–63. 
49  Grotius (note 39), at 2.8.3; van Leeuwen (note 46), 180. 
50  Van der Keessel (note 29), 163. 
51  Grotius (note 39), at 2.8.3.  Cf. Scheltinga (note 39), 131 (at 
Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.3), and van der Keessel (note 39), 146 (at Grotius, 
Inleidinge 2.8.3), who disagreed with Grotius and concluded that painting 
on a canvas falls under adiunctio and not under specification. 
52  Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, §§ 1, 4, and 5; but cf. Voet 
(note 42), 731–32 (at D.41.1, § 21). 
53  Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, § 5, quoted below note 56.  
See also Osler (note 8), 105, on the Commentarii Iuris Civilis of Franciscus 
Connanus (1508–51): 
Connanus' examples are unfortunately disconcerting for the modern 
reader, whose natural expectation is that raw materials will gener-
ally represent only a small proportion of the value of the manufac-
tured object: unlike Connanus, we would tend to think of the wine as 
being of considerably more value than the grapes from which it is 
pressed; for us, then, wine would serve as a prime example of the 
manufacturer acquiring ownership.  
54  See van der Keessel (note 29), 161, relying on Gaius in D.41.1.7.7, 
which according to him gives a more detailed explanation and restricts 
Institutes 2.1.25.  2004  Nova Species  105 
 
 
Vinnius extends this example to all leguminous plants55 such as 
lupins, lentils, peas, chickpeas, and beans.56  Vinnius draws a 
clear distinction between ears of corn on the one hand and grapes 
and olives on the other.  Ears of corn are not the material from 
which corn is produced: corn remains of the same species and 
retains the same name.  By contrast wine and olive oil are created 
from grapes and olives: they have different names and have been 
converted into different species.57  Voet strongly disagrees with 
this view.  He argues that on this reasoning one could contend 
that both wine and oil could be said to be contained in the grapes 
and olives in their completed form.  No more does wine become 
such by the pressing of grapes, than grain becomes such by the 
rubbing and shaking of ears of corn.  By no means is wine merely 
revealed by breaking, through pressure, the skins which hold the 
juice of the wine, no more so than grain is revealed by breaking 
open, through rubbing, the husks which hold enwrapped the 
grains of ears.58 
  With regard to the theories underlying specification, Roman-
Dutch authors support either the occupation theory or the acces-
sion theory.  Van der Keessel in his Dictata on Justinian's Insti-
tutes59 tries to discover the true basis for acquisition by spe-
cification.  He points out that many interpreters agree with 
Justinian that it is some kind of accession, for they consider that 
the raw matter accedes to the form given to the res by the specifi-
cans.60  But van der Keessel cannot accept this because the form 
                                         
55  Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, § 5.  These plants have 
seeds in pods.  The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 9th ed. 
(Oxford, 1995), s.v. Leguminous. 
56  Vinnius extends it further: et poterant quoque in alium usum con-
verti, uvae siccari, oleae servari ad condituram etc.  Et alioqui dicendum 
esset, nec caseum aut butyrum ex lacte alieno factum, nec siceram ex pomis 
alienis expressam facientis fieri.  Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, § 5.  
57  Id. 
58 P. Gane (ed.), The Selective Voet (Durban, 1957), 6:204 (to 
D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.)): 
Should you say with Vinnius . . . that it would have been possible for 
the wine or oil not to be pressed from the grapes or olives, but for the 
grapes to be dried and the olives to be pickled, that has nothing to do 
with the case.  The ears too can be given without threshing as fodder 
to draught animals, and thus equal reasoning still applies to both 
ears and grapes. 
59  For what follows, see van der Keessel (note 29), 161–62.  
60  See Böckelmann (quoted in van der Keessel, note 29, 161), who 
classifies specification as an accessio artificialis species and then contin-
ues: quo casu materia cedit formae et res fit specificantis, nisi ad priorem 
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cannot exist without the matter.  The form is not anyone's res, to 
which the res of another can accede.  Therefore the better opinion 
is that specification is an example of a res nullius falling to the 
occupier.  The grapes from which wine is produced do not remain 
but are clearly extinguished.  Therefore their ownership also va-
nishes.  The wine that was made from the grapes is a nova species 
which did not exist before and has a new name.61  That a res 
nullius is that which is taken possession of by the specificans is 
clear from D.41.1.7.7 (Gaius 2 rerum cott.), where it is said that 
the basis for the Proculian view is that the res that was produced 
had not existed before.  To this must be added D.41.2.3.21 (Paul 
54 ed.), where the words vel quae ipsi, ut in rerum natura essent, 
fecimus clearly refer to specification and intimates a new species 
which did not exist in nature up to then.62  It must therefore be 
observed, says van der Keessel, that that res is possessed by a 
title pro suo, the same title by which one possesses a res acquired 
by occupation.  This is also the reason why animus sibi habendi is 
necessary in all cases of occupation.  Moreover, says van der 
Keessel, it causes confusion to classify specification as a form of 
industrial accession.  He concedes that if a nova species could be 
reduced to its raw materials, one could indeed speak of industrial 
accession, for in such a case the nova species accedes to the mat-
ter.  Thus, when a vase or rings are fashioned from your gold or 
silver, accession would apply and you would acquire the vase or 
rings: you acquire the nova species on the strength and power of 
your matter.  He therefore concludes that form could accede to 
matter, but not matter to form. 
  The same idea is expressed by Vinnius in his commentary on 
Justinian's Institutes.63  Vinnius says that it is absurd (perperam) 
to consider specification a form of acquisition by accession.  He 
argues, like van der Keessel, that when something is made from 
another's res, the nova species is not created on the strength and 
power of the res, or against our will or in our ignorance, but by 
our effort.  Moreover, it is absurd to say that the matter accedes to 
the form, because the form presupposes the matter and not vice 
versa.  Therefore, says Vinnius, this mode of acquisition should be 
regarded rather as some form of occupation: that which is 
produced becomes the property of the maker, because it belonged 
                                         
61 Quoting  D.41.1.26 pr. (Paul 14 Sab.).  
62  See also van der Keessel (note 39), 146 (at Grotius, Inleidinge 
2.8.1):  Iurisconsulti Romani rationem acquisitionis ex eo repetunt, quod 
species nova, quae facta est, antea in rerum natura non fuerit. 
63  For what follows see Vinnius (note 24), at Institutes 2.1.25, intro-
duction – § 1.  2004  Nova Species  107 
 
 
to no one before, and thus belongs to the occupans who made it for 
himself.  He cites Nerva and Proculus as authorities for this 
view.64  Insofar as the opinion of Sabinus has been accepted (that 
is, his opinion on the case where the nova species could be reduced 
to its former state), he concedes that accession could be applicable, 
but prefers to regard it as a case where no new acquisition has 
taken place.65 
  The strongest support for the accession/labor theory is im-
plicit in the treatment of specification as a form of industrial 
accession, a treatment adopted by quite a number of Roman-
Dutch authors.66  Van Leeuwen explains that an "artificial" acces-
sion occurs when something is added to our things not by their 
own nature but by human labor and skill.67  Further support for 
the accession/labor theory can be found in the argument used by 
Grotius (in the Inleidinge) and others that the form (ghedaente) 
does more for the essence of the final product than the matter 
from which it has been made.68  Consequently when the form is 
altered the object itself becomes something different from what it 
was before.  In the relevant passage Grotius clearly shows that he 
does not regard the matter as having perished, but only that it 
                                         
64 This view is also supported by van Leeuwen (note 43), 131 
(approving the taking of ownership where the materials are either con-
sumed or are entirely changed in nature).  The fact that Vinnius (note 24), 
at Institutes 2.1.25, § 1, refers to D.41.2.3.21 (Paul 54 ed.), is proof that he 
must have had occupation in mind.  See further Voet (note 42), 732 (at 
D.41.1, § 21), who argues that the previous material will only perish or 
disappear if the final product cannot be reduced to its former condition, 
and then specification takes place; the result is the same whether the 
maker is in good or bad faith: neque bona vel mala fides specificatoris 
efficere possit, ut magis aut minus res ipsa prior videatur superesse.  Id. 
65  Van Leeuwen (note 43), 131, correctly questions whether these in-
stances of reducibility are truly illustrations of specification: 
Semper inspiciatur utrum res extincta fuerit, nec ne; nam si manente 
materia, forma tantum externa mutetur, atque id quod factum est ad 
priorem et rudem materiam reduci possit, ratio naturalis non patitur, 
ut dicamus ipsam rem dominii sui naturam mutasse; sed potius vires 
et conditionem materiae, ut potentioris existentiae, sequi [ D.41.1.24 
(Paul 14 Sab.);  D.32.78.4 (Paul 2 Vit.)]  neque haec prop. loquendo 
specificatio dici potest. 
66  Voet (note 42), 731–32 (at D.41.1, § 21); van Leeuwen (note 43), 
131. 
67  Van Leeuwen (note 43), 131: Accessio artificialis est, qua rebus 
nostris, non tam ex sui natura, quam ex humano labore, et industria ali-
quid accedit. 
68  Van Leeuwen (note 46), 181: "[I]nasmuch as . . . the form does 
more to the essence of the thing than the material, he who has made the 
new substance is entitled to the property therein . . . ." 108  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
has been altered to such an extent that it has been converted into 
something else.69  This is also borne out by a passage in Grotius' 
De Iure Belli ac Pacis, where he presents the natural law view 
that the new final product should become the common property of 
the owner of the material and the maker.  Here he states that the 
form is only part of the substance and not the whole, and then 
quotes Ulpian as saying that, by the change of form, the sub-
stance was almost (and not totally) destroyed.70  Further support 
for the accession/labor theory is found in the acknowledgment of 
Grotius and Schorer that the painter becomes the owner of a 
painting painted on another's canvas.71  Schorer reasons that in 
the case of painting there is in some sense a specification, that is, 
the creation of a new species, for the form is the essence of the 
thing and gives the thing its identity.72  None of the authors 
would, however, go so far as Böckelmann and declare that the 
matter accedes to the form and becomes the property of the speci-
ficans.73 
IV.  Scottish Institutional Writers 
Most of the Scottish institutional writers require a new species or 
something similar for specification.  Thus Stair, Erskine, and Bell 
describe specification as the producing (making or forming) of a 
new species (or subject) from materials belonging to another.74  
Bankton states that specification occurs "where one makes a 
                                         
69  Grotius (note 39), 2.8.2.  This is supported by the footnotes of 
Simon van Groenewegen van der Made (whose notes are appended to 
editions of the Inleidinge after 1644), who refers to the definition of 
"abesse" in D.50.16.13.1 (Ulpian 7 ed.), where Sabinus and Pedius are 
quoted as saying that things are regarded as missing even if their sub-
stance remains but their form has changed.  Groenewegen also refers to 
D.34.2.6.1 (Marcellus resp.).  For these notes, see Maasdorp (note 39), 70 
n.2. 
70 H.  Grotius,  De Iure Belli ac Pacis, tr. F. W. Kelsey (New York, 
1964), vol. 2, at 2.8.19.2: "The form in fact is a part of the substance, not 
the whole substance; and this was perceived by Ulpian, when he said that 
the substance was almost destroyed by changing the form." 
71  Grotius (note 39), 2.8.3.  
72  Schorer, in Maasdorp (note 39), 418 (at Grotius, Inleidinge 2.8.3): 
"[I]n the case of the painting there is in some sense a specificatio — that 
is, a creation of a new species, for the form is of the essence of the thing, or 
gives the thing its being, as Grotius points out . . . ." 
73  Quoted above, note 60. 
74  J. Dalrymple [Viscount Stair], The Institutions of the Law of Scot-
land, ed. D. M. Walker (Edinburgh, 1981), 313 (at 2.1.41); J. Erskine, An 
Institute of the Law of Scotland, ed. J. B. Nicolson (Edinburgh, 1871), 
1:264 (at 2.1.16); J. Erskine, Principles of the Law of Scotland, 21st ed. 
(Edinburgh, 1911), 123–24 (at 2.1.8–9); Bell (note 4), 504 (§ 1298(1)). 2004  Nova Species  109 
 
 
species or piece of workmanship out of another's materials."75  
Stronger words than the mere making of a new thing are used.  
Stair talks of producing a new thing, and Bell of rude materials 
having been manufactured into a different species.76  Some writ-
ers refer to the workmanship77 involved in the production, and 
some call the specificans by the grand name of "artificer" or, less 
grand, "workman."78  Bell requires a change to be produced on the 
substance.79 
  Most institutional writers repeat some of the Roman exam-
ples of new species.  Stair for instance mentions the examples of a 
cup or other artifact made of metal, wine produced from grapes, 
cloth from another's wool, and a ship from another's timber.80  
New examples are also added, namely, malt produced from an-
other's bear,81 malt or meal produced from grain,82 flour produced 
from corn,83 bullion made into a cup or tankard,84 and a statue 
fashioned from wood.85  Besides the Roman example of the dying 
of cloth, the malting of barley86 is mentioned as an example of a 
process that does not change the species of the material into a 
new species.  
                                         
75  A. McDouall [Lord Bankton], An Institute of the Laws of Scotland 
(Edinburgh, 1751; reprinted 1993), 1:507 (at 2.1.2.13) (quoting Institutes 
2.1.25). 
76  Stair (note 74), 313 (at 2.1.41); G. J. Bell, Commentaries on the 
Law of Scotland, 7th ed. (Edinburgh, 1870; reprinted 1990), 1:297. 
77  Stair (note 74), 313 (at 2.1.41). 
78  See Bankton (note 75), 507 (at 2.1.2.13–14) (artificer, workman); 
Bell (note 4), 504 (§ 1298(1)) (workman). 
79  Bell (note 4), 504 (§ 1298(1)). 
80  Stair (note 74), 313 (at 2.1.41).  G. MacKenzie, The Institutions of 
the Law of Scotland, 7th ed. (Edinburgh, 1730), at 2.1.7, mentions the 
examples of the ship, the cup, the wine, and the oil.  Erskine, Institute 
(note 74), 264 (at 2.1.16) and Principles (note 74), 123 (at 2.1.8) mentions 
the examples of plate made of bullion and grapes turned into wine.  In 
Principles (note 74), 124 (at 2.1.9), he refers to a new species produced by 
the mixing of different substances. 
81  Stair (note 74), 313 (at 2.1.41).  The Scottish National Dictionary, 
ed. W. Grant (Edinburgh, 1941), vol. 1, s.v. Bear: "A kind of barley hardier 
than the ordinary kind but of inferior quality.  Ordinary barley has two 
rows of grain on the head, bear four. . . .  It is also called BIG or BIGG."  
82  Bankton (note 75), 518, discussing English law but stating that 
the law of Scotland is the same. 
83  Bell (note 4), 504 (§ 1298(1)). 
84  Bankton (note 75), 518, discussing English law but stating that 
the law of Scotland is the same.  
85  Bankton (note 75), 507 (at 2.1.2.13). 
86  The malting of barley was a far easier process than the malting of 
bear, the older and hardier type of barley.  See Scottish National Diction-
ary (note 81), s.v. Bear.  110  Roman Legal Tradition  Vol. 2 
 
 
  With regard to the theories that form the basis for specifica-
tion, the institutional writers provide strong support for the ac-
cession/labor theory.87  Bankton, Erskine, and Bell classify speci-
fication under the head of industrial accession.88  Bankton states 
that industrial accession occurs "when any thing accrues to a 
person on account of workmanship or industry, employed by him 
upon it, so that the matter becomes accessory to the work-
manship."89  Erskine in his Principles explains that where the 
final product cannot be reduced to the matter from which it was 
made, there is no room for the legal fiction that the former subject 
is still existing, and "therefore the workmanship draws after it 
the ownership of the materials."90  Bell states that "industrial 
accession is produced by the art or industry of man."91  S t a i r  
explicitly accepts that when the final product is not reducible to 
its former condition, the materials cede to the workmanship.  This 
happens, he continues, not only when the materials are con-
sumed, but even when they remain and cannot be reduced to their 
first nature.92  This clearly shows that he does not consider the 
final product to be a res nullius, open for occupation.  None of the 
institutional writers, except perhaps Bell, refers to the occupation 
theory either expressly or implicitly.  Bell's statement that, if the 
materials as a separate existence be destroyed, the property is 
with the workman,93 can perhaps be construed as implicit support 
for the traditional occupation theory. 
                                         
87  The accession theory is also supported by various modern Scottish 
decisions, e.g., Wylie and Lochhead v. Mitchell, 8 M. 552 (1870), where 
Lord President Inglis, at 556, describes specification as "the production of 
a new subject of property by art and industry, where the materials belong 
to one party, and the skilled labour is supplied by the other," and at 557, 
where he classifies specification as a kind of industrial accession.   
88  Bankton (note 75), 507 (at 2.1.2.12); Erskine, Institute (note 74), 
264 (at 2.1.16) and Principles (note 74), 123 (at 2.1.8); Bell (note 4), 503–4 
(§ 1298).  
89  Bankton (note 75), 507 (at 2.1.2.12).  
90 Erskine,  Principles (note 74), 123 (at 2.1.8).  Note that in Institute 
(note 74), 264 (at 2.1.16), Erskine also refers to the mentioned legal fiction 
(fictio iuris), but did not proceed to draw such a clear conclusion from the 
fiction. 
91  Bell, (note 4), 503 (§ 1298). 
92  Stair (note 74), 313 (at 2.1.41).  Stair's reference to Connanus, who 
allots the final product on the basis of the relative value of the 
workmanship and the materials used, is also a clear indication that Stair 
might implicitly have considered that the extent of workmanship involved 
in producing the new species does also play a role in determining whether 
a new species has been created. 
93  Bell (note 4), 504 (§ 1298(1)). 2004  Nova Species  111 
 
 
V.  Examples of Novae Species in Modern 
Scots and South African Law 
Scots case law contains quite a number of illustrations of novae 
species.  In D. & G. Black v. Incorporation of Bakers, Glasgow,94 
the Lord President of the Court of Session recognized that a miller 
who ground a quantity of wheat into firsts-grade corn, seconds, 
thirds, and bran, had created four separate subjects of property of 
a complete and immutable kind.95  I n  Oliver and Boyd v. The 
Marr Typefounding Co.,96 the Outer House of the Court of Session 
apparently decided that a new species was created where a 
quantity of metal type made for printing was melted down and 
converted into new type.97  In International Banking Corporation 
v. Ferguson, Shaw, and Sons,98 refined cottonseed oil was mixed 
with suet (hard fat of kidneys and loins of oxen or sheep) to pro-
duce a new product, namely, a lard compound (rendered and 
clarified for use in cooking and pharmacy).  In M'Laren Sons & 
Co. v. Mann, Byars & Co.,99 the sheriff court decided that by con-
verting cloth into workmen's garments the clothing company had 
destroyed the separate existence of the cloth and created a new 
species.  In McDonald v. Provan (of Scotland Street) Ltd.,100 the 
court was willing to assume that a new species was created when 
the front part of a stolen vehicle, including half the chassis, the 
engine, and the gears, was welded to the rear portion of another 
vehicle to produce a built-up car.  Specification was rejected in 
this case because the court decided that the two components of 
the built-up car were separable and because the requirement of 
bona fides had not been complied with.  In Armour v. Thyssen 
Edelstahlwerke AG,101 Lord Mayfield in a decision of the Outer 
House of the Court of Session expressed the view that there had 
been specification where stainless steel strip coils had been cut 
into shorter lengths for the purpose of making sinks, and there 
was evidence that they could not be recovered in their original 
form.  He seems to have been influenced by the fact that the steel 
                                         
94  6 M. 136 (1867). 
95  Id. at 141. 
96  1901 S.L.T. 170 (Outer House). 
97  It is not altogether clear whether Lord Stormonth Darling had 
specification in mind.  He decided that the shape of the article was greatly 
changed and its identity completely destroyed, but doubted very much 
whether the defenders could consider the conversion of the type as 
terminating their possession and consequently their obligation to restore.    
98  1910 Sess. Cas. 182. 
99  [1935] 51 Scottish Law Review 57 (Sheriff Court). 
100 1960 S.L.T. 231, 231–32 (Outer House). 
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trade would recognize that the steel was in a different form and 
thus in a manufacturing or commercial sense a new species.  On 
appeal both Lord Wylie102 and Lord McDonald103 criticized this 
view.  Lord McDonald concluded: "I do not consider that market 
forces can create a new species for the purpose of specificatio."104 
  South African case law has up to now been very reluctant to 
recognize that novae species have been created.  In my opinion the 
facts, in a few reported cases, can be construed in such a manner.  
These are where a table was welded from scrap metal (for the top) 
and iron (for the legs);105 where a built-up motor vehicle was 
structured from components of two wrecks and other materials;106 
and where a garden shed was completely dismantled and built up 
into a much larger shed.107  Only one case tentatively accepted the 
creation of a nova species, namely, where new tape holders were 
supplied with a new "dress" consisting of a distinctive label, 
containers, and an insert bearing the trade mark and pictorial 
matter.108  This case has, however, been criticized as blurring the 
line between specification and copyright.109  
                                         
102 1989 S.L.T. at 191L–192A. 
103 1989 S.L.T. at 190J 
104 Id. 
105 S. v. Riekert, 1977 (3) SALR 181 (T). 
106 These are the facts of Khan v. Minister of Law and Order, 1991 (3) 
SALR 439 (T), where the court incorrectly held that this was a case of 
accession of movables. 
107 These facts are adapted from Aldine Timber Co. v. Hlatwayo, 1932 
T.P.D. 337.  But see Barry, J., at 341: 
It seems to me that the circumstances in this case show that the work 
done on the old material was not in the nature of specification, 
because no new species has been created and the original article has 
not ceased to exist as such.  The illustrations given of turning grapes 
into wine and corn into bread, show clearly what specification means, 
and I think there can be no doubt that on the facts of this case the 
material does not fall under that category. 
But here the new material had not been added to the old material for the 
purpose of enlarging the shed.  The old shed had first been demolished and 
thereafter the old material had skillfully been used with the new material 
to construct a brand new shed.  The creative skills employed to fashion the 
final product were not sufficiently taken into account by the court.  
108 Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd. v. A. Roopanand Brothers (Pty) Ltd., 
1991 (3) SALR 240, 246B–C (D). 
109 See the discussion of the case by C. Visser, "Termination of Copy-
right by Accession and Specification," Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins-
Hollandse Reg 54 (1991): 813–818. 2004  Nova Species  113 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion 
So when will the substance of the material be sufficiently changed 
that one can conclude that a new species has been created?  Is it 
when the old species has perished; when the final product has a 
new identity; when the final product has a new name; when the 
new product is worth considerably more than the old product; or 
when the old species has been converted into a new commercial 
species?  The difficulty with inanimate objects is that they are not 
as clearly divided into various species as are plants and animals.  
We no longer fully comprehend, let alone follow, the Aristotelian 
hierarchy of existences based on the distinction of matter and 
form, and have to rely on precedent and common sense in deter-
mining whether a new species has been created.  And in trying to 
reach a conclusion, it seems reasonable and fair to accept that 
both Scots and South African law provide sufficient authority for 
the accession/labor theory that a court should consider the 
amount of workmanship and skill involved in the creation of the 
final product.  If this is done, it seems reasonable to classify two 
South African cases as instances where a new species had been 
created: where a garden shed had been dismantled and a much 
bigger shed had been constructed from the old and with newly 
bought materials, and where a built-up BMW motor vehicle had 
been constructed from materials recovered from two wrecked 
BMWs.  The South African courts considered these as cases of 
accession and refused to consider specification on the ground that 
the final products were still a shed and a BMW.110 
  Let us now return to Kinloch Damph and the smolt turned 
into salmon.  Although I agree with the court that the husbanding 
of smolt in that case did not result in a nova species being created, 
the court has in my opinion gone too far in stating almost cate-
gorically that natural processes of growth can never result in 
specification.  There might well be some cases where human in-
tervention in the natural growth of plants or living creatures may 
be considered specification.  An example that springs to mind is 
where a Japanese horticulturist converts a thousand saplings into 
bonsai trees by scientifically retarding their growth.  Another 
example is where the normal development of chrysalides is skill-
fully directed to bring into being a rare species of butterfly.  A 
final example is from a decision of the Dutch High Court (Hoge 
Raad) in 1994 in the case of a chicken farm.111  The chicken far-
mer bought a large quantity of eggs from a supplier and the latter 
                                         
110 Aldine Timber (note 107) and Khan (note 106), respectively. 
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reserved ownership of the eggs until full payment.  In order to 
breed the eggs artificially, the eggs had to be placed in hatching 
machines for a period of three weeks, the position of the eggs in 
the machines had to be regularly changed, and the temperature 
and humidity of the premises had to be carefully regulated.  This 
process hatched thousands of chickens for sale.  On the bank-
ruptcy of the farmer, the court had to decide whether the 
reservation of ownership still affected the eggs that were trans-
formed into chickens.  The court decided that this was not the 
case, since the eggs had undergone such a transformation that the 
reservation could no longer apply to them. 
 